We introduce a notion of syntactical truth predicate (s.t.p.) for the second order arithmetic PA 2 . An s.t.p. is a set T of closed formulas such that:
of formulas and environments, i.e. assignments of integers and sets of integers to first and second order variables. It can be defined by induction, the most interesting cases being :
• T 0 (t ∈ X, ρ) ⇔ n ∈ ρ(X) where n is the value of the term t under ρ.
• T 0 (A → B, ρ) ⇔ (T 0 (A, ρ) ⇒ T 0 (B, ρ))
• T 0 (∀XA, ρ) ⇔ ∀S(T 0 (A, (X, S) :: ρ)) where (X, S) :: ρ is an ML-like notation for the environment associating S to the variable X and ρ(Y ) to any other variable Y .
For closed formulas the environment is irrelevant so one can simply write T 0 (A).
If A, B and ∀XC are closed we have
D]) for any closed set definition λx.D(x).
Guided by the above observation, we introduce the concept of syntactical truth predicate for second order arithmetic, which can be taken as a semantics for PA 2 formalizable in the language of PA 2 . This notion is also connected with Dragalin's semi-formal system for the theory of definable sets of natural numbers (see [6, 7, 8] ).
In the classical framework it is enough to consider universal first order and second order quantifiers and the entailment connective →.
Definition 1.2 A syntactical truth predicate (s.t.p.) is a set T of closed formulas of second order arithmetic such that i) T (t = u) iff the closed terms t and u are convertible, i.e. have the same value in the standard interpretation ii) T (A → B) iff (T (A) ⇒ T (B)) iii) T (∀xA) iff (T (A[x ← t]) for any closed term t) iv) T (∀XA) iff (T (A[X ← λx.D(x)]) for any closed set definition λx.D(x))
Note 1.3
1. Since s.t.p.'s deal with closed formulas, no membership case has to be considered in the previous definition.
In iv) A[X ← λx.D(x)
] may be a bigger formula than ∀XA. Thus, s.t.p.'s are intrinsically circular objects which can not be handled with recursive constructions. Hence their existence is non-trivial.
3. The terminology syntactical truth predicates should be clear: here we interpret the universal quantification ∀X by a quantification over definitions of sets, i.e. over a piece of syntax.
4. Whereas Tarski's semantical truth predicate is a third order object, syntactical truth predicates remain at the second order.
If the language is augmented with the connectives ↔, ∨, ∧, ¬ and the existential quantifier defined in the usual way (with ⊥ being 0 = 1 in the definition of ¬) then every s.t.p. T satisfies the following derived clauses: ii bis) T (A ∧ B) iff (T (A) and T (B))

T (A ∨ B) iff (T (A) or T (B))
T (A ↔ B) iff (T (A) ⇔ T (B))
T (¬A) iff (not T (A)) iii bis) T (∃xA) iff (T (A[x ← t]) for some closed term t) iv bis) T (∃XA) iff (T (A[X ← λx.D(x)]) for some closed set definition
λx.D(x))
As for first order formulas a syntactical truth predicate is nothing but arithmetical truth:
Lemma 1.4 Let T be a syntactical truth predicate. A closed first order formula is in T if and only if it is true in the standard interpretation with base N.
Proof We prove in fact that for every first order formula F (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with free variables among x 1 , . . . , x n and for all closed terms t 1 , . . . , t n the formula F (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is in T iff it is true in the standard interpretation with base N.
The proof is a straightforward induction on F . 2
The sequel of this paper is organized as follows.
In §2 we look at the status of Leibniz's equality axiom and the induction axiom, which happen to be equivalent with respect to s.t.p.'s. In §3, using Gödel's hierarchy of constructible sets, we prove in set theory the existence of an s.t.p.
(which is in fact Leibniz, i.e. satisfies Leibniz's axiom . Also, a long Appendix details some developments of the ramified analytical hierarchy within the formal system PA 2 necessary for the proof of the above last result.
All along the paper, provability in PA 1 is refined to provability in (IΣ 2 Equality and syntactical truth predicates
Leibniz syntactical truth predicates
Recall that the second order characterization of equality
is a formula equivalent (modulo some weak comprehension axioms) to the conjunction of the axiom of equality ∀x x = x and Leibniz's axiom (Leibniz) ∀x∀y(x = y → ∀X(x ∈ X → y ∈ X)) (for the ← direction, use the set definition λz.(x = z)).
Proposition 2.1 Let T be a syntactical truth predicate.
The following statements are equivalent (a) T (∀x∀y(x = y → (A(x) → A(y)))) for every second order formula
A(x) in which x is the sole free variable. (b) T (A(t)) ⇒ T (A(u)) for every second order formula A in which x is the sole free variable and every closed terms t, u with the same value. (c) T (∀xA) ⇔ (T (A[x ← S n (0)]) for every n ∈N) for every second order formula A in which x is the sole free variable. (d) T (∀x∀y(x = y → ∀X(x ∈ X → y ∈ X)))
If A is a first order formula then statements (a),(b),(c) above are all true.
Proof 1) (a) ⇔ (b) and (a) ⇔ (d) come from clauses (iii) and (iv) in the definition of s.t.p.'s.
(b) ⇒ (c) Since every closed term is equal to some S n (0) we deduce (c) from In particular, suppose we reduce that language to 0 and the sole successor function S. Second order quantifications over binary relations R allow to define + and × from S as follows: 
Inductive syntactical truth predicates
The following result relates Leibniz's axiom and the induction axiom
with respect to syntactical truth predicates.
Lemma 2.4 An s.t.p. T is Leibniz if and only if it contains Ind.
Proof (⇒) Let A be a formula with at most one free variable x. We have
Given the fact that T is an s.t.p. we have to show that T (∀x∀yH(x, y)). Since T contains the induction axiom, we argue by induction on x and y.
• T (∀yH(0, y)) is shown by induction on y : T (H(0, 0)) trivially holds.
T (H(0, S(u))) holds since T (0 = S(u)) means that 0 and S(u) have the same value which is impossible.
• Assume that T (∀yH(t, y)) holds. We show by induction on y that T (∀yH(S(t), y)) holds:
p. S(t) and S(u) must
have the same value hence so do t and u. By induction hypothesis we
Existence Theorem in ZF
We now prove an existence theorem as an application of Gödel's hierarchy of constructible sets ( [13] ).
Theorem 3.1 The existence of a Leibniz syntactical truth predicate is provable
in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.
L be the set of constructible sets of natural numbers in the sense of [13] . Let T be the restriction to closed formulas of Tarski's semantical truth predicate in the structure (N, P(N ) L ). We claim that T is a syntactical truth predicate.
Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) for s.t.p.'s are trivially satisfied. We prove clause (iv) in its existential version (clearly equivalent in the presence of clause (ii)):
We first prove the ⇐ implication. Since L is a model of the comprehension
An easy induction over formulas F then shows that the semantical truth value
is in T , i.e. is true, then A is true under environment (X, U ), so that the closed formula ∃XA is true, i.e. is in T .
We now prove the ⇒ implication. It is established in [13] , see also [1] , that there exists a well-ordering on P(N ) L which is definable in (N, P(N ) L ) by a second order formula. We will write Less(X, Y ) for such a formula. Let A(X) be a formula with a second order variable X. If there exists in P(N ) L a set satisfying A then the least of such sets (in the sense of the well-order) is definable
Remark 3.2 Using generic models of set theory satisfying V = L in which there are ∆ 1 3 well-orderings of the continuum (see [16, 17, 18, 28] ), the above construction leads to different syntactical truth predicates.
4 Second order logic and arithmetic
Syntax of second order logic in natural deduction
We follow Takeuti [29] 
Here ¬A stands for the intuitionistic negation A → (0 = 1). In these rules Γ is any finite set of formulas, A, B, D are formulas, x, X are any first, second order variables, t is a first order term. The left rules are introduction rules and the right ones elimination rules. The ∀ introduction rules are subject to the condition that the quantified variable is not free in a formula of Γ.
As usual, a proof is a finite sequence J 1 , . . . , J n of sequents such that for any 
This rule is also equivalent to the second order comprehension schema (cf. [12] , (c) The axiom of equality ∀x x = x and Leibniz's axiom
Second order arithmetic
(which imply ∀x∀y(x = y ↔ ∀X(x ∈ X ↔ y ∈ X)) , cf. §2.1).
(d) The axiom of induction, which is nothing but the definition of integers in second order logic, (a) the comprehension schema is restricted to ∆
where A, B run over Σ 
where σ( x) stands for σ(x 1 ), . . . , σ(x n ) and similarly for σ( X).
Definition 5.2 Let σ be a substitution and t be a first order term.
• We define the substitution σ{x ← t} by the equations
• Similarly we define σ{X ← λx.D}.
• If x is a first order variable we let σ x = σ{x ← x}.
When σ is closed for F, σ x is no more closed in general.
We have the following elementary lemma concerning substitutions:
Similar results hold for second order substitutions.
We can now state the main result of this section.
If T is Leibniz then the same holds for sequents provable in
PA 2 .
Points 1,2 are (formalizable and) provable in (IΣ
Proof We argue by induction on the proof of Γ A:
• The case of the assumption axiom (Ass) is trivial.
• For the (→ i) rule assume that
• For the (→ e) rule assume that
• For the (
Consider a term t and a particular substitution σ and define σ = σ{x ← t}. We have
• The (∀ 2 i) and (∀ 2 e) rules are treated in an essentially equivalent manner, replacing first order terms t by set definitions.
• Eventually note that ¬¬(A) → A is true under T since T (¬A) is equivalent to ¬T (A).
To prove Point 2, observe that first order axioms of PA The following corollary will be strengthened in §6.10. 
2. A structure M for the language of second order arithmetic consists of the following data:
M, U are sets, 0 M is an element of M , and = M is a binary relation over
is a unary (resp. binary) function over M . The following Theorem is classical. 2. However, the existence of T ruth M can not (in general) be proved in PA 1 .
We denote T ruth
3. Since T ruth M consists of (Gödel numbers of) formulas and parameters in the structure, we see that M is always recursive in T ruth M .
We mention an easy but useful Proposition. 
where φ is any second order formula.
T ruth M satisfies all axioms and is closed by all other rules of
L 2 .
Points 1,2 are formalizable and provable in (IΣ
Proof Point 1 is the model theoretical version of the equivalence mentioned in Remark 4.3. Point 2 is easy.
The canonical model associated to an s.t.p.
To any s.t.p. T we shall associate a structure for which T is exactly the associated semantical truth predicate restricted to closed formulas.
Definition 6.6 Let T be a set of closed formulas of the language of second order arithmetic. 
2. We associate to T a structure of the language of second order arithmetic
where (a) CT is the set of closed terms, 0 T is the term 0 and S T , + T , × T are the obvious syntactical operations on CT , 
M T is recursive in T and the whole construction of M T is formalizable within
Lemma 6.8 Let T be a syntactical truth predicate.
Let A be a formula with free variables among
x = x 1 , . . . , x m , X = X 1 , . . . , X n . Let t = t 1 , . . . , t m , λz. D = λz.D 1 , . . . ,
λz.D n be finite sequences of closed terms and closed set definitions. Then
In particular, T coincides with the restriction to closed formulas of
M T and T ruth
M T are recursive in T . 3. (IΣ 0 1 , C∆ 0 1 )-PA 1
proves the existence of T ruth M T and the formalizations of Points 1,2 (involving the Gödel number of A and codes for the assignments of variables).
Proof We prove Point 1 by induction on A :
• The case where A is the atomic formula u = v is trivial.
• If A is the atomic formula u
• If A is B → C then the equivalence is clear by clause ii) in the definition of syntactical truth predicates.
• If A is the formula ∀yB then, applying the induction hypothesis and the ordinary substitution lemma for T ruth M T , we get
• If A is the formula ∀Y B then applying the induction hypothesis (and denoting λz.D a closed set definition) we get Robinson's axioms. We conclude using Lemma 6.8. 2
We now prove the main Theorem of this section.
Theorem 6.10 Let T be a syntactical truth predicate.
There exists an ω-model
and T ruth M are recursive in T . • X ⊆ CT is saturated if ((T (t = u) ∧ t ∈ X) ⇒ u ∈ X for all closed terms t, u).
If T is Leibniz then M T itself is (up to isomorphism) an
• Let Def(T ) be the family of saturated sets in Def(T ).
All these notions are clearly definable in M T . Also, M T = (CT , Def(T )) constitutes a substructure of M T .
• By construction, all sets in Def(T ) are saturated. Thus, M T satisfies Leibniz's axiom, whence also (via an easy induction on formulas) Leibniz's
• Now, we prove that M T satisfies the comprehension schema. In fact, let Z be a subset of CT definable in M T by a formula φ. Then Z is also definable in M T by the formula obtained from φ by relativizing all second order quantifiers to Def(T ). Notice that we use here the fact that
comprehension, we have Z ∈ Def(T ). Now, since M T satisfies Leibniz's schema and Z is definable over M T , Z is necessarily saturated. Using Proposition 6.5, we conclude that M T satisfies L 2 .
• Let X ∈ Def(T ) be such that (0 ∈ X) ∧ ∀x(x ∈ X → S(x) ∈ X). Then every term S n (0) is in X. Now, any closed term t is convertible to some S n (0) and M T satisfies t = T S n (0). Since X is saturated we see that t has to be in X. This proves that the induction axiom is true in M T .
• Finally, Robinson's axioms trivially hold. The ⇒ direction of the equivalence comes from Theorem 6.10.
As for the other direction, which is the object of this section, we adapt the proof of Theorem 3.1 within a second order arithmetical framework. The natural idea is to replace Gödel's constructible hierarchy by its arithmetical version: the ramified analytical hierarchy (RAH).
The development of RAH within PA 2 is rather long and technical and will be treated in the Appendix.
The Ramified Analytical Hierarchy
In set theory, the RAH is defined by induction on ordinals as follows: 
RAH is much related to β-models of PA 2 introduced by Mostowski (1959 [24] , see also [25] ): models (M, F), with F⊆P (M ), for which the notion of wellordering is absolute: if R∈F codes a total ordering such that every non empty set X∈F has an R-smallest element then the same is true for X outside F. Up to an isomorphism, the basis of such models is necessarily standard: M = N (just apply the hypothesis to the natural ordering on M ). Gandy & Putnam (see Boyd & Hensel & Putnam, 1969 [4] ) proved that
• β 0 is the supremum of the ordinal types of well-orders in RAH .
For a detailed review and some proofs, see Apt & Marek (1974 [2] ), Kreisel 
where Φ is any second order formula. 
where Φ is any second order formula and ρ(z, x, U ) is the formula
or the dual formula ∀X(. . . → z ∈ X). In the Appendix, we present to some extent the development of RAH in PA 2 :
• (Up to our knowledge) No reasonable direct development of RAH in PA 2 has ever appeared in print. Only very recently, a detailed presentation of the set theoretic constructible hierarchy coded within PA 2 became available in Simpson's book (1999 [27] ).
• Though there is no surprise and all expected results just go through, such a development asks for some care (and more space than waving hands arguments). In particular, to prove in PA 2 that RAH is a β-model (i.e.
that well-orderings in the sense of RAH are true well-orderings, cf. Appendix, Proposition D.14) requires some work (whereas it is trivial in set theory). This last result is needed to get the key relativization properties of the definable well-ordering on RAH.
• Last but not least, in order to get Point 2 of Theorem 7.5 it is necessary to check the details of such a development as is done in D.3.
Proof of the Equivalence Theorem
Only the ⇐ direction of the equivalence in Theorem 7.1 remains to be proved. 
Consider an ω-model
Conclusion
Among the questions raised by this paper let us mention the relation between Dragalin's semi-formal syntax [8] and the syntactical truth predicates proposed here as a possible semantics.
Let us remark that a syntactical semantics of third order arithmetic can be given in an analogous way, the treatment of third order quantification being similar to the second order case. Notice however that such syntactical truth predicates are still second order objects, whereas the semantical truth predicate is a fourth order object. This remark immediately generalizes to any order.
A Some naive set theory in PA 1
This long Appendix is devoted to the proof of Theorem 7.5.
Conventions Implicit extensions by definitions are systematically used.
Derivations in PA 2 are presented in a more or less formal way, sometimes mixing vernacular descriptions and formal statements. Some arguments and assertions are also given model theoretic intuition.
A.1 Cantor pairing function and variations
We shall constantly code tuples, finite sequences and infinite eventually zero sequences of integers by integers. We cite below the useful properties of such codings. It is easy to explicit some recursive constructions and to define this coding by first order formulas (which can be taken Σ 0 1 or Π 0 1 ) such that all basic expected properties can be proved in PA (cf. [19] p105-108 or [27] p.65-69).
Let <x, y> = (x+y)(x+y+1) 2 + x denote Cantor bijection from N 2 onto N.
Finite sequences with fixed length are coded via Cantor functions:
For k = 2 we use the classical notations x = <π 1 (x), π 2 (x)>. 
For infinite eventually zero sequences (useful for assignments of variables)
we use proj ∞ (k, x) = π 2 (π
1 (x)). In particular, the everywhere zero sequence is coded by 0.
A.2 Relations in PA 1
The following notions and notations take place in PA 1 , i.e. correspond to first order formulas (with second order variables) such that PA 1 proves all basic expected properties.
Sets coding binary relations
To a set α we associate the relation
Total orderings Suppose rel(α) is a reflexive total ordering relation on
Domain(α).
We shall write i ≤ α j (resp. i < α j) in place of <i, j> ∈ α (resp. <i, j> ∈ α ∧ i = j). Proper initial segments are denoted
Successor and limit orderings are defined in the usual way.
Lexicographic product and ω power of total orderings.
α ⊗ β = {<<i, m>, <j, n>> | i < α j ∨ (i = j ∧ m < β n} α ω = {<x, y> | ∀i(proj ∞ (i, x), proj ∞ (i, y) ∈ Domain(α)) ∧∃i((proj ∞ (i, x) < α proj ∞ (i, y)) ∧ ∀j<i(proj ∞ (i, x) = proj ∞ (i, y)))}
A.3 Sets coding families of sets
With sets it is possible to code countable families of sets as slices of the binary relations associated to sets, cf. Def.6.1. Such countable families will be sufficient to develop RAH in PA 2 . In the sequel equality for sets X = Y is to be interpreted as ∀x(x ∈ X ↔ x ∈ Y ).
Definition A.1 (Total orderings on families of sets in PA 1 ) 1. Let rel(ξ) be a total ordering relation and X be a set. We associate to ξ a relation
which is to be interpreted as follows:
• REL(ξ, X) is a total ordering relation with domain the family of sets 
This notion is particularly suited for the case ξ is a well-ordering. Usual results about well-orderings are provable in PA 2 and even in CΠ 
We write ≤
Notation B.6 We denote T |W = {<u, v> ∈ T | j ∈ W }, so that (T |Domain(α <i ))[j] = if j < α i then T [j] else ∅.
Theorem B.7 (Definition by induction)
To every formula A(α, Z, R) (possibly with some other first order and second order parameters) we associate the formula IN D A (α, Z, R) α is a total ordering of Domain(α) ∧ A(α, Z, R)
∧∀i ∈ Domain(α) A(α <i , Z|Domain(α <i ), Z[i]) ∧∀i / ∈ Domain(α) Z[i] = ∅
Let F unc A be the formula ∀α∀Z∃!R A(α, Z, R). The following assertions
We denote Z(α), R(α) the unique such Z, R associated to α.
If Φ is a formula we let Inductive
A,Φ be ∀α∀Z∀R((A(α, Z, R) ∧ ∀m ∈ Domain(α)Φ(Z[m])) ⇒ Φ(R)) Then PA 2 +(rel(α) is a wo) + F unc A + Inductive A,Φ proves Φ(R(α)).
Let Iso(I, α, β) be a first order formula which expresses that rel(α), rel(β) are total orderings and I is an isomorphism between rel(α) and rel(β). If
Ψ is a formula we let IsoInd A,Ψ be the formula ∀α∀Z∀R ∀α ∀Z ∀R ∀I((A(α, Z, R) ∧ A(α , Z , R)
∧Iso(I, α, α ) ∧ ∀m ∈ Domain(α)Ψ(Z[m], Z [I(m)])) ⇒ Ψ(R, R )) Then PA 2 +(rel(α) and rel(β) are isomorphic wo) +F unc A + IsoInd A,Ψ proves Ψ(R(α), R(β)).
If A is a first order formula (with free second order variables) then (a) In all previous items, one can replace
(c) Let Θ(X, p, P ) be a formula, where p, P are first order and second order parameters. Let Good Θ (β) be the formula
If second order quantifications in Φ, Φ , Ψ, Ψ are relativized to (2) with relativized formulas are provable in
ii. equivalences (1) with relativized formulas are provable in As for the existence, apply the comprehension schema to get
•
• If E were not the whole of Domain(α) there would exist an α-smallest We also let R m be such that A(α <m , Z m , R m ).
Case 3 m is α-successor of p. We let Z m , R m be such that
all three cases, whence m ∈ E , contradiction. This proves that E =
Domain(α).
Now, let Z be such that
Let R be such that A(α, Z, R). It is clear that IN D A (α, Z, R), which proves
the existence assertion in item 1.
2)-3), 4) (c) are easy.
4) (a)
Observe that E is defined by a Σ
Theorem B.8 (Definition by simultaneous induction)
If A(α, Z 1 , R 1 , Z 2 , R 2 )
is a formula (possibly with some other first order and second order parameters) we let IN D
A (α, Z 1 , R 1 , Z 2 , R 2 ) be the formula rel(α) is a total ordering of Domain(α) ∧ A(α, Z 1 , R 1 , Z 2 , R 2 ) ∧∀i ∈ Domain(α)A(α <i , Z 1 |Domain(α <i ), Z 1 [i], Z 2 |Domain(α <i ), Z 2 [i]) ∧∀i / ∈ Domain(α)Z 1 [i] = Z 2 [i] = ∅
Obvious adaptations of all assertions in Theorem B.7 are valid.
As an easy application of Theorem B.7, we prove in CΠ Convention B.9 1. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the
Gödel numbering of formulas is such that
• 0 is the Gödel number of the formula x 0 ∈ X 0 ,
• every element is a Gödel number (for some second order formula),
• the natural ordering refines the subformula ordering. We denote ω Godel the natural ordering when considered for Gödel numbers.
2. We denote GN (F ) the Gödel number of the formula F and GN → (f, g), 
where V al(M, t, x, z) is a first order formula insuring that z is the value of the term t in M for the assignment of first order variables coded by x (cf. [19] p.119-127 or [14] p.78; the expected properties of this formula being provable in PA).
where Subst ∞ (z, i, x) denotes the unique y such that
We get the desired truth predicate by rearrangement in Cantor coding:
C Extensions of ω-models
C.1 Extension by definitions of an ω-model
We shall now focus on the sole ω-structures.
Definition C.1 1. To every set U we associate an ω-structure
and families of (codes of) definable relations over Ω(U ) :
where T ruth Ω(U )) is as in Def.6.2 and 
T rue
where Φ is any Σ m ∞ formula and Φ Slices(U ) is its relativization.
Proof 1) Trivial. 2) By induction on f we show that
We consider the sole case f = GN (x i ∈ X j ) and only treat the first equality. If 
∀p Slices(Def
Proof 1) Observe that T rue under all arithmetical functions. Therefore, it suffices to prove that the sets
constructed in the proof given in Application B.10 are all in Slices(U ). This is done by induction over Gödel numbers:
which gives a simple definition of (Def
We conclude using closure properties of the family Slices(U ).
• Other atomic cases and the induction steps are trivial applications of closure properties of Slices(U ).
2)
First, recall
item 1) an easy induction proves that, for every Gödel number f , there exists q
Applying item 4 (b) in Theorem B.7 (and expliciting all parameters which were omitted in the statement of this theorem), we get a second order for- Since ω Godel is limit, we can apply item 4 (c) ii in Theorem B.7 which proves that the definition of the relation z ∈ Z Ω(U [p]) (ω Godel ) relativizes to Slices(U ).
Thus, letting u be such that proj ∞ (0, u) = p and r = <GN ( ψ(x 0 , X 0 )), 1, u>,
. Now, T ruth 
, so that we get q such that Def
C.2 Well-ordered models
We now consider well-orderings on ω-models as introduced in Definition A.1.
Proposition C. 4 1. The following are provable in CΠ
2. The following is provable in CΠ
Proof 1) The fact that Slices(U ) is an initial segment is due to the definition of the lexicographic product and to the equality: 
We call (R, η) the chain-union of the α-chain (Z, ζ). such that the following are provable in CΠ
We denote RAH α , λ α , Seq-RAH α , Seq-λ α the unique such R, η, Z, ζ associated to α. 
be a formula, where p, P are first order and second order parameters.
where Ψ Θ is Ψ with second order quantifications relativized to
Idem with λ α . 
If rel(α) = ∅ then T rue
2) Item (b) uses the fact that when α is limit we consider the chain-union, so that a definition for Seq-RAH α induces one for RAH α .
3) is a direct application of item 4 of Proposition C.2 in case rel(α) is successor. 
Intuitive interpretation of these formulas in a model (M, F) of PA 2 :
• RAH ⊆ F is the union of all families Slices(RAH α ) where α ∈ F is such that rel(α) is a well-ordering, . We conclude using Proposition B.1 item 3, which gives an embedding of the range of f onto an initial segment.
3) It suffices to prove these properties for initial segments α = δ <n , n ∈ Domain(δ), of any wo rel(δ). Suppose that the desired properties are true for all δ <p such that p < δ n, we prove that they are valid for δ <n .
We can suppose δ <n to be RAH-contributive, else there would be nothing to prove. Applying item 1), all δ <p such that p < δ n are also RAH-contributive, hence satisfy properties 3-4 according to the induction hypothesis.
Case n is the δ-smallest element, i.e. δ <n = ∅ Trivial, since RAH ∅ = λ ∅ = Seq-RAH ∅ = Seq-λ ∅ = ∅.
Case n is the δ-successor of m, hence RAH δ <n = Def Proof 1) Mere reformulation of the last item of the previous Proposition D.9.
2) If X is in RAH we consider γ such that X ∈ Slices(RAH γ+1 ) and Slices(RAH γ ), γ + 1 are in RAH .
We let Rank(X) be the < RAH smallest set β in RAH such that rel(δ) is isomorphic to rel(γ + 1). 
